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This paper examines the capital allocation within Korean chaebol firms during the period from 
1991 to 2000. We find strong evidence that, during the pre-Asian financial crisis period in the 
early 1990’s, poorly performing firms with less investment opportunities invest more than well-
performing firms with better growth opportunities. We also find the evidence of cross-
subsidization among firms in the same chaebol group during the pre-crisis period. It appears that 
the existence of the "dark" side of internal capital markets explains most part of this striking 
phenomenon where “tunneling” practice has been common during the pre-crisis period. However, 
the inefficient capital allocation seems to disappear after the crisis as banks gain more power and 
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Evidence shows that corporate divisions or diversified firms in a conglomerate are not 
financially independent (see Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998)). Accordingly, internal 
capital markets play a major role in allocating capital in diversified firms. Numerous studies 
have investigated the benefits and costs of internal capital markets within diversified firms 
during the past few years. Two competing views are broadly posited regarding the allocation of 
capital and managerial resources in diversified firms. One viewpoint suggests that internal 
capital markets can enhance value.
1 This “value-added” view claims that the headquarters of a 
business group allocate group resources most to its member firms with the most growth 
opportunities through the formation of an internal capital market, in which internally generated 
cash flows can be effectively pooled among member firms or different business divisions. Stein 
(1997), for example, argues that diversified firms can enhance efficiency because corporate 
headquarters engage in reallocation of funds across projects.  
Another viewpoint argues that internal capital markets can hinder capital allocation 
efficiency.
2 For example, Johnson et al. (2000) use the term “tunneling” to refer to the practice 
that controlling shareholders transfer corporate assets and resources out of firms for their own 
benefits. This “tunneling” view predicts the resource transfer from a healthy member firm to a 
weaker one and claims that internal capital allocation tends to be inefficient. Given the mixed 
viewpoint, the issue of whether diversified firms allocate capital efficiently or poorly is still 
debatable, and offers the need for further investigation especially across different countries, 
industries, and periods.  
                                            
1 For example, see Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), Stein (1997), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2000). 
 
2 For example, see Meyer, Milgrom, and Robert (1992), Scharfstein (1998), Shin and Stulz (1998), Shin and Park 
(1999), Johnson et al. (2000), Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), and Scharfstein and Stein (2000). 
  1 
  
This paper investigates the capital allocation within Korean large business groups 
(chaebols) during the period from 1991 to 2000. In particular, we examine whether capital 
expenditures of chaebol affiliated firms (here-in-after chaebol firms) can be justified by the 
investment prospect and depends on the cash flows of their own or of other firms in the same 
chaebol group. We then compare these results with those for non-chaebol firms. We use Korean 
chaebol firms because their internal fund operation is similar to US conglomerates that allocate 
funds according to each division’s needs and corporate strategic planning. Chaebol firms are 
usually owned by a large shareholder or family, who can influence investment and financing 
decisions of the whole chaebol group. Concerning that chaebols are extremely well diversified, 
we should shed the light on the growing large body of literature on corporate diversification and 
internal capital markets. Furthermore, since our sample covers the financial crisis period (1997-
1998), we can also compare the efficiency of capital allocation before the crisis with that after 
the crisis. To an extent that the post-crisis market disciplines inefficient firms, we expect that 
capital allocation becomes more efficient after the crisis than before the crisis.  
First, we examine whether a firm’s investment is related to the investment opportunities 
using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities perceived by the market. We find 
chaebol firms’ investment policy is not sensitive to future profitability of the investment 
throughout our sample period. On the other hand, investment by independent firms with more 
focused line of business is more responsive to good investment opportunities, especially after the 
financial crisis.  
Second, we examine whether there is a relationship between investment and internal cash 
flows. We find a significantly negative relationship between a chaebol firm’s investment and 
internal cash flows during the pre-crisis period, which implies that poorly performing firms were 
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even making greater investments. After the crisis, however, the chaebol firms became more 
sensitive to their own operating cash flows, turning the negative relationship into positive. We 
also find that non-chaebol firms’ investment is independent (yet positive) of their own operating 
cash flows during the pre-crisis period, but became significantly sensitive (and more sensitive to 
chaebol firms) to their internal funds after the crisis. This finding tells us that both chaebol and 
non-chaebol firms are more financially constrained after the crisis than before the crisis. It is also 
consistent with the existing literature, which confirms that chaebol firms are less financially 
constrained than independent firms. Shin and Park (1999), for example, show that investment-
cash flow sensitivity is significantly lower for chaebol firms than for other firms. Using Japanese 
firm data, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1991) document that the liquidity of Japanese 
independent firms has a strong positive relationship with the investment expenditures, while the 
investment expenditures of Japanese keiretsu firms are less sensitive to cash flows. 
Third, chaebol firms’ negative relationship between investment and internal cash flows 
during the pre-crisis period cast reasonable doubt on possible cross-subsidization. So, following 
Shin and Park (1998), we also examine whether the investment of a chaebol firm is related to the 
financial condition of other firms in the same chaebol group. We find that a chaebol firm’s 
investment decision is positively affected by the cash flows of other firms in the same chaebol 
group during the pre-crisis period. Our results during the pre-crisis period are consistent with the 
findings of Shin and Park (1998), and provide another evidence of cross-subsidization in 
diversified firms reported in Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998). We further document 
that the cross-subsidization is mainly arranged by poorly performing firms, suggesting that there 
were wealth transfers from healthy member firms to weaker firms. Overall, these findings 
support the “tunneling” view by Johnson et al. (2000).  
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Finally, we report that the degree of inefficiency in capital allocation among chaebol 
firms has decreased after the financial crisis. During the post-crisis period, at least better 
performing firms are making greater investments although they are not much related to 
investment opportunities. And the cross-subsidization pattern has disappeared in our sample 
period after the financial crisis. This finding is consistent with the argument by Kim et al. (2004). 
They argue that main banks gain power by charging higher interest rates to their client firms after 
the onset of the financial crisis in Korea, and show evidence that the market continues to 
discipline Korean chaebols.  
The issues addressed in our work are also related to a few empirical studies documenting 
the productivity of diversified firms of conglomerates. For example, Maksimovic and Philips 
(2002) compare productivity between the different segments within a conglomerate. They find 
that main divisions on average are more productive than peripheral divisions and that the sales 
growth of one division is closely related to its productivity and industry business cycle. On the 
other hand, Schoar (2002) shows evidence that although conglomerates are more productive than 
stand-alone firms at one time, dynamically, diversified firms experience net reduction in 
productivity. In a more recent paper, Villalonga (2004) find that conglomerate diversification 
continues to generate discounts, while related diversification is associated with premiums. The 
view posited in this line of research is broadly consistent with the argument in our empirical 
results.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe characteristics of Korean 
firms with an emphasis on chaebol firms. The data used in our paper are discussed in Section III. 
Section IV presents empirical results, which document the existence of the dark side of internal 
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capital markets for chaebol firms during the pre-crisis period (but not after the crisis). Section V 
presents concluding remarks.  
 
II.  Characteristics of Korean Firms 
 
A chaebol, or a large business group in Korea, is a giant conglomerate or financial 
clique, and is unique to the Korean corporate sector and has recently attracted much attention 
in academia because of their role before and after the financial crisis in Korea.
3 Furthermore, 
the chaebol dominate the Korean economy. Krugman (1998) notes that the top 30 largest 
chaebol companies account for nearly 40% of total economic activity in Korea in 1996. As it 
is shown in the list of the top 30 chaebols in 1996 provided in Appendix 1, the largest 
business groups such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK have over 50 affiliated companies. 
The associated companies may include financial service firms offering a full range of 
financial services from credit card and insurance to securities underwriting and venture capital. 
The number of financial arms for each chaebol appears in the last column of Appendix 1. The 
top five chaebol, in particular, have a median number of 6 financial arms, while the median 
for top 30 chaebol is 2. 
Yoo and Lee (1987) classify chaebol groups into three categories depending on the 
timing of their formation. Chaebols formed in the late 1950s, such as Hyundai, Samsung, and 
Lucky-Goldstar (LG), were established by the founder through government support such as 
disposal of government vested properties. Chaebols of the 1960s, such as Hanjin, Korea 
Explosive, Hyosung, Sangyoung, and Dong-A, were established as a result of foreign loans. 
Finally, Chaebols of the 1970s, such as Daewoo, Sunkyong (SK), Lotte, Kolon, and Doosan, 
                                            
3 The chaebol system is similar to the Japanese keiretsu with regard to government sponsorship of a long-term main 
bank-firm relationship, but differs fundamentally in that Korean banks did not own corporate equity. 
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were formed during a period of economic boom and of unprecedented export growth. 
Throughout the post-Korean War period, the Government has sponsored the formation and 
growth of chaebols, to forward rapid economic growth and development.  
The business activities of Korean chaebol firms are widely diversified. Yoo and Lee 
(1987) find that, among their sample firms in Korea, 72% of them have run more than two 
business departments under one umbrella. In Samsung group, for example, major 
manufacturing firms such as Samsung Electronics, Samsung Heavy Industries, and Samsung 
Chemical are connected with affiliated firms by providing raw materials and intermediate 
goods and services like Samsung Electro Devices, Samsung Corning, and Samsung Electro-
Mechanics. This intra-group trade, accompanied by flexible credit terms, creates an internal 
capital markets through accounts receivable and accounts payable. Deloof (2001) points out 
that the existence of intra-group claims lessens the need for liquid reserves. The third column 
of Appendix 1 reports the ratio of intra-group sales in ratio to total sales for each chaebol. The 
average (median) of the intra-group sales to total sales ratio in 1996 is 17.9 (14.9) percent for 
the top 30 chaebols and 24.5 (19.2) percent for the top 5 chaebols.  
Despite the size and diversification of the chaebols, most chaebol affiliated firms are 
still under the control of the founding family owner. Chaebol firms are linked by direct or 
indirect shareholdings, and the founder typically serves as a chairman of the core company 
within the chaebol. The controlling shareholder in a chaebol is usually the CEO and Chairman 
of the Board while the other members of the board are executives he/she has selected. There is 
evidence that the controlling shareholders (owners) of the chaebol have sought to maximize 
their influence by increasing the size of the firm and the group, even at the expense of 
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profitability of individual firms.
4  The benefits to controlling shareholders of large firms 
include social, political, and economic rewards that are proportional to the scale of operations 
firms. For example, if a chaebol acquires a new business division, the controlling shareholder 
of the chaebol can staff executive positions at the new business division with hand-picked 
subordinates.  
Kook, Park, and Lee (1997) report evidence that the fifty largest chaebols focused on 
the firm growth rather than firm value. Choi, Park, and Kho (2000) find that individual non-
chaebol firms also prefer growth in size to profitability. Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat 
(2003) also demonstrate the so-called "profit stabilization hypothesis" where contending 
Korean firms pursue enlargement rather than maximization of profits. Government economic 
development plans, which gave priority in financing to large firms in the export sector, 
through the provision of low loan rates and forbearance in rolling over bank loans,
 have given 
both chaebol and non-chaebol firms an added incentive to emphasize growth of sales over 
profit maximization. 
5  
The financial system has traditionally been used as an instrument for the Korean 
Government's economic development policy tools. The government intervened heavily in the 
banking system to channel credit to desired industries. Moreno (1998) notes that banks were 
not free to use standard business criteria in evaluating and monitoring projects. Most 
commercial banks were nationalized in the early 1960s, and the government influenced the 
allocation of credit both directly through the appointment of bank management and credit 
controls, and indirectly through various regulations and incentives. Although a privatization 
                                            
4  Choi, Park, and Kho (2000) point out that this structure creates a conflict between the interests of the controlling 
shareholder and the other shareholders of chaebol affiliated firms, since projects that advance the interests of the 
group might be pursued at the expense of particular firm shareholders.  
5 Most commercial banks were under government control in Korea. An example of one of the few commercial banks 
free from government control is Shinhan Bank, established by Korean Japanese investors in 1982.   
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program started in the early 1980s resulted in widely dispersed ownership of many 
commercial banks, government continued to exercise de facto control of most banks through 
the late 1990s and competition in the banking system continued to be limited.
6 The result was 
a tightly controlled government-administered financial system characterized by a chronic 
excess demand for credit, even by profitable and viable firms. Borensztein and Lee (2000) 
provide evidence of inefficient credit allocations among Korean manufacturing sectors for the 
period from 1970 to 1996 by comparing performance of firms and their ability to obtain credit. 
Furthermore, there is the pervasive expectation that troubled borrowers and lenders would 
benefit from government bailouts, thus aggravating inherent adverse selection and moral 
hazard in the market for credit.  
In summary, Korean chaebol firms are nurtured by the government, highly diversified, 
dominate the economy, controlled by a founding family, and draw more credit from banks 




We use a unique data set provided by Seoul-based Korea Information Service (KIS) for all 
industrial firms listed in Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and KOSDAQ stock market from 1991 to 
2000.
7 KIS is the leading provider of credit related information and services for financial and 
commercial business transactions among corporations and consumer individuals in Korea. Most 
                                            
6 A number of researchers, including Berg (1999), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), and Radelet and Sachs (1998), argue 
that the combination of strong government and weak financial institutions exacerbated adverse selection and moral 
hazard in credit allocation in the period leading up to the financial crisis in 1997. 
7 KOSDAQ stock market is the Korean version of the NASDAQ market where a large number of fast-growing 
young technology firms are listed. Interestingly, the bubble burst in KOSDAQ market around the same time it did in 
early 2000. 
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previous studies on Korean firms employ PACAP database, but PACAP Korea database 
provides only limited information on accounting and stock prices. For example, research and 
development (R&D) expenditures and account receivables from affiliated firms are not available 
from PACAP database for Korea. Unlike the PACAP database, our data from KIS contains 
comprehensive financial information for each KSE and KOSDAQ firm. The company profile 
and financial information data are compiled from financial statements, business reports, and 
audit reports that every company is mandated to produce on an annual basis.  
To keep track of how chaebol groups have allocated their resources across their affiliated 
firms over time, we first identify whether each firm is affiliated with chaebol at one point of time. 
Once each firm is classified as chaebol or non-chaebol, we then examine the time-series pattern 
of the capital allocation practices for each category of firms. For the definition of chaebol, we 
use the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC)’s annual report and Financial Supervisory 
Commission’s 1996 guideline.
8 The KFTC designates the top 30 business groups in terms of 
asset and we define these 30 groups as chaebols in this paper. We select total of 6878 firm-year 
observations between 1991 and 2000. Among the 6878 observations in our sample, 843 firm-
years are classified as chaebol firm observations and the remainder of 6035 firm-years as non-
chaebol observations.  
The summary statistics of capital expenditure (normalized by sales) are reported in Table 
1.
9 We use the year-end Korean Consumer Price Index to deflate total assets in 2000 Korean won. 
Capital expenditure is the changes in the sum of fixed assets and depreciation divided by net 
sales.  We find that chaebol firms spend more on capital expenditures than non-chaebol firms. 
                                            
8 KFTC legitimately defines a business group as “a group of companies, more than 30 percent of whose shares are 
owned by some individuals or by companies controlled by those individuals” The KFTC identifies business groups 
and announces them every year. 
9 Scharfstein (1998), suggesting that firms show more degree of freedom in allocating assets across divisions than 
they have in allocating sales, uses sales as his normalization. 
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This may suggest that chaebol firms invest in less lucrative projects, supporting the view of over-
investment hypothesis in Korea by Shin and Park (1999). Panel A of Table 1 shows that the 
mean and median capital expenditures for the whole sample period are 4.5 percent and 2.1 
percent of sales respectively. While the mean and median investments for non-chaebol firms are 
4.1 percent and 2.0 percent of sales respectively (panel B), the mean and median capital 
expenditures for chaebol firms are 7.7 percent and 3.5 percent of sales respectively (panel C). In 
order to investigate whether this result is affected by the Asian Financial Crisis, we also examine 
the capital expenditures of chaebol and non-chaebol firms year by year for the sample period. 
Pre- and post-crisis analyses of investments present results consistent with the analysis of the 
whole sample period: Capital expenditures of chaebol firms are greater than those of non-
chaebol firms. However, both chaebol and non-chaebol firms spend less on capital expenditures 
after the crisis of 1997 than before the crisis.  
We present important financial differences between chaebol and non-chaebol firms in 
Table 2. We first find that chaebol firms are significantly larger than non-chaebol firms in size. 
The average (median) size of total assets of chaebol firms is almost 4 (9) times larger than that of 
non-chaebol firms. This is hardly surprising, however, given the managerial objectives of growth 
and diversifying efforts widespread among chaebol firms in the Korean economy. The firm’s 
market to book ratio is used to measure Tobin’s Q representing the growth opportunities of firms. 
The market-to-book ratios are higher for non-chaebol firms than chaebol firms, suggesting that 
the growth opportunity is higher for non-chaebol firms than chaebol firms. We also find that 
chaebol–affiliated firms have significantly lower cash flows than non-chaebol firms. Weinstein 
and Yafeh (1998) argue that Japanese main bank client firms show poor performance partly due 
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to main banks' risk aversion and main banks' rent extractions. We further offer an inefficient 
over-investment problem as a possible reason for poor performance by chaebol-affiliated firms.  
In Table 2, we see that capital expenditures of chaebol firms are also greater than those of 
non-chaebol firms when we normalize them by net assets, not by sales as we did in Table 1. 
Consistent with the result for cash ratio, chaebol firms hold less working capital as a substitute of 
cash. We can have negative working capital because it is defined as current assets minus current 
liabilities minus cash. The leverage is significantly higher for chaebol firms than for non-chaebol 
firms. However, the ratio of bank loans to total debt is lower for chaebol firms than for non-
chaebol firms. R&D investment is also slightly lower for chaebol firms than for non-chaebol firms.   
The last three rows of Table 2 present the summary statistics of cash holdings normalized 
by net assets, compensating balance normalized by the average bank loan, and non-bond interest 
expenses normalized by average bank loan. We can also find that there is a significant difference 
in the ratio of compensating balance to average bank loan between chaebol firms and non-chaebol 
firms. The median compensating balance ratio for chaebol firms is 10.6%, while that for non-
chaebol firms is 24.8%. This indicates that for non-chaebol firms, they might be forced to place as 
much as a quarter of their outstanding bank credit. Finally, the last row in Table 2 shows that the 
median non-bond interest expenses to bank loan ratios for chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms 
are close to each other. This is consistent with the notion that the nominal borrowing rates for 
firms in Korea are similar regardless of the credit worthiness due to regulatory arrangement. 
In summary, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 document that chaebol firms are on 
average significantly larger than non-chaebol firms, but are more levered, less liquid, and valued 
less than non-chaebol firms by the market. Chaebol firms seem to have less growth opportunities 
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than non-chaebol firms in spite of a higher level of capital expenditures, while these are consistent 
with the low level of the R&D intensity.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Table 3 reports the results of regressions to see whether diversified firms allocate capital 
efficiently or inefficiently and whether the inefficient allocation exists in the pre-crisis period 
(but not in the post-crisis period). Our model builds on the previous studies by further exploring 
the issue of investment inefficiency. Rather than looking at the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
and its relationship with Q  as in Shin and Stulz (1998), we directly relate investment to Q 
following the approach by Scharfstein (1998). The dependent variable, CAPXDEV, is the 
difference between diversified chaebol firm’s capital expenditures (normalized by sales) and the 
median capital expenditures (also normalized by sales) of single segment firms in the same two-
digit industry.  
In order to see whether the capital expenditures are related to industry investment 
opportunities, we use IndustryQ, the median beginning-of-period Q of all single-segment firms 
in the same 2-digit SIC code. Q is defined as (firm’s book value of total assets + market value of 
outstanding shares – book value of equity) / firm’s book value of total assets. The investment 
equation also incorporates variables that are thought to boost investment activity. The investment 
of firms might be driven by availability of cash flow. More specifically, the investment of 
chaebol firms can be related not only to its own cash flow but also to the cash flow of other firms 
in the same chaebol group. Correspondingly, the other variables are: CFSDEV, the ratio of 
chaebol firms' cash-flow to sales less the industry median ratio of cash flow to sales for single-
segment firms; Other_CFSDEV, the median CFSDEV value of all other affiliated group. Cash-
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flow is defined as operating income plus depreciation. We use median value instead of mean 
because mean value can be influenced by one mega large group firm. For example, since 
Samsung Electronics is much greater in sales than any other group firms, Samsung group’s 
capital expenditure is more likely to be affected by Samsung Electronics’ cash flow to sales ratio 
rather than those of any other firms in Samsung group. It should be noted, however, that we 
obtain similar results when mean values are used instead of medians. We include year dummy 
variables to account for macroeconomic effects as in Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001). To 
screen out outliers due to low values of sales, we winsorize both capital expenditure to sales ratio 
and cash-flow to sales ratio at its 1
st and 99
th percentiles. 
Panel A of Table 3 provides the results during the whole sample period from 1992 to 
2000.
10 The first column of Table 3 provides the results of regressing CAPXDEV on the median 
beginning-of-period Q of the single segment firms in the industry. The coefficients of IndustryQ 
are not statistically significant indicating that there is no significant relation between industry-
adjusted capital expenditure and the industry investment opportunity measured as the industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q. The inclusion of CFSDEV or Other_CFSDEV has little effect on the 
coefficient of IndustryQ. The coefficients of CFSDEV or Other_CFSDEV are also meager. The 
coefficient of CFSDEV is significant at the 0.10 level in only one regression model (Model 2).   
In sub-sample periods (panels B to C), we do not see any notably different pattern on the 
coefficient of IndustryQ. On the other hand, the coefficient estimates of CFSDEV and 
Other_CFSDEV show quite different patterns between pre-crisis period (panel B) and post-crisis 
period (panel C). Most notably, the coefficient of CFSDEV is negative and statistically 
significant in the pre-crisis period, but positive and significant in the post-crisis period. The 
                                            
10 Our regression results start from 1992, not 1991, since the explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of 
the period.  
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apparent reversal in the coefficient shows that poorly performing chaebol firms are making 
greater capital investment during the pre-crisis period, but that at least after the crisis, better 
performing chaebol firms are making greater investments although those investments are not 
significantly related to industry investment opportunities. This is evidence that the pre-crisis 
investment by chaebol firms was inefficient and risky.  
As discussed above, the investment of chaebol firms can be related to the cash flow from 
other firms in the same chaebol group, as well as their own cash flow. In order to control for the 
effect of other firms in the same chaebol, we added the variable Other_CFSDEV in Model 3. The 
third column of panel B of Table 3 indicates that the coefficient of median cash flow to sales 
among other firms in the same chaebol group, Other_CFSDEV, is positive and statistically 
significant during the pre-crisis period. These results are consistent with the findings of Shin and 
Park (1999) that a chaebol firm’s investment decisions are affected by other firms’ liquidity 
within the same chaebol group. However, the coefficients of Other_CFSDEV are not significant 
after the crisis (third column of panel C of Table 3), suggesting that the inefficient capital 
allocation through cross-subsidies seemed to lessen after the crisis. 
It might be expected from the “tunneling” view by Johnson et al. (2000) that the 
inefficient capital allocation may show up more strongly in poorly performing firms. Table 4 
focuses on our tests by looking at the poorly performing firms and well-performing firms 
separately. In particular, we see whether there is any relation between a poorly performing firm’s 
capital expenditure and the cash flow of well performing firms in the same chaebol group.  
Part I of Table 4 applies our tests to those firms with superior operating performance. We 
select the firms whose industry-adjusted cash flow to sales is above median among the chaebol 
firms in our sample and examine their investment activity associated with investment 
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opportunities and cash flow. In Part I, we cannot find any significant relations between capital 
expenditures and (own or other) cash flows we documented in Table 3.  
In part II of Table 4, panels D to F perform the same analysis for firms with below-
median operating performance. Panel E of Table 4 suggests that the negative relation between 
capital expenditure and IndustryQ during the pre-crisis period (shown in panel B of Table 3) are 
mainly due to the poorly performing chaebol firms. More interestingly, the coefficients of 
Other_CFSDEV are positive and significant only for poorly performing firms (not for well-
performing firms) during the pre-crisis period (panels B and E), suggesting that the cross-
subsidies were arranged mainly by poorly performing firms to undertake value-decreasing 
investments using funds from better performing firms.
11 These results provide strong evidence 
on the existence of the pre-crisis dark side of internal capital market.  
  Scharfstein (1998) points out the possibility that the relationship between industry-
adjusted capital expenditure and IndustryQ can be negatively biased by construction. To address 
this potential problem, we use the variables without industry adjustment (CAPXS,  CFS and 
Other_CFS) and then estimate the relationship for chaebol firms and for non-chaebol firms 
separately following his approach. The dependent variable, CAPXS, is capital expenditures 
(normalized by sales) for diversified chaebol firms. CFS is the cash-flow to sales ratio, where 
cash-flow is the operating income plus depreciation. Other_CFS is the median CFS value of all 
other affiliated group firms. The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. The results for chaebol 
firms without industry adjustment in Table 5 show similar results to those in Table 3. The results 
for non-chaebol firms in Table 6 show sharp contrast to the results for chaebol firms in Table 5. 
For the full sample period in panel A of Table 6, we see that industry Q and cash flow are all 
significantly related to the ratio of capital expenditure to sales, and panel C shows that the effects 
                                            
11 Note that the coefficients of IndustryQ are not significant in all panels of Table 4. 
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are mainly due to from the post-crisis period. It appears that non-chaebol firms have come to 
make efficient investment especially after the onset of financial crisis.     
In Table 7, we perform the same experiments as we did in Table 4 with the new set of 
variables used in Table 5. We divide our chaebol sample into two groups: firms whose CFS, cash 
flow to sales ratio, is above median or firms with below median CFS. The results in Table 7 are 
also quite similar to those in Table 4. Part I of Table 7 shows the results for chaebol firms with 
above median CFS. During the pre-crisis period, there is no significant relationship between 
capital expenditure and cash flow (panel B). In contrast, part II of Table 7 shows that there is 
significant negative relationship between capital expenditure and cash flow for poorly 
performing firms during the pre-crisis period (second and third columns of panel E), but the 
coefficients of CFS are positive and significant after the financial crisis (second and third column 
of panel F). This reversal in the coefficients indicates that the inefficient capital allocation during 
the pre-crisis period was mainly due to the poorly performing firms, but the inefficiency 
disappears after the financial crisis. Surprisingly, for well-performing firms, we see the negative 
correlation between investment and their own cash flow after the crisis, even though the 
magnitude and significance level of the coefficient are much smaller than those of poorly 
performing firms during pre-crisis period. 
In third column of panels B and E of Table 7, the coefficients of Other_CFS are positive 
and significant for both well-performing and poorly performing firms, suggesting that both firms 
are involved in cross subsidies before financial crisis. However, the magnitude and statistical 
significance level of the coefficients are much higher for poorly performing firms than for well-
performing firms. This is consistent with our earlier results that poorly performing firms are 
main actors in cross-subsidies during the pre-crisis period.  Again, cross-subsidies disappear after 
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crisis (third column of panels C and F), which emphasizes that the dark side of internal capital 
markets existed during the pre-crisis period, but not in the post-crisis period.  
In summary, as predicted, independent firms with more focused line of business are more 
responsive in investment to good investment opportunities, especially after the financial crisis.  
On the other hand, diversified chaebol firms make inefficient investment throughout in the 1990s.  
During some time in the pre-crisis, poorly performing chaebol firms were even making greater 
investments.  Our empirical results are broadly consistent with the findings in Hoshi, Kashyap, 
and Sharfstein (1991) where the liquidity of Japanese independent firms has a strong positive 
relationship with the investment expenditures, while the investment expenditures of Japanese 
keiretsu firms are less sensitive to cash flows. 
Our results are important since chaebol system provides unique evidence of the role of 
internal capital markets for diversified firms, which have global presence. First, the chaebol 
system has the structure of the existence for many diversified and focused firms under one 
business group. For example, as of the end of 2001, Samsung Group has over 40 affiliated firms 
ranging from electronics to financial services and entertainments. Some firms like Samsung 
Electronics are highly diversified firms, which typically have more than a dozen business units, 
while a group-affiliated firm like Samsung Corning is quite focusing on only manufacturing of 
glass for TV tubes and LCD monitors. Almost all group-affiliated firms, however, are connected 
to each other through trading of raw materials and intermediate goods and services. Also, the 
cash poor firms borrow from cash rich affiliated firms. This intra-group trade and borrowing, 
accompanied by flexible credit terms, effectively creates an internal capital market. This business 
environment is similar to Japanese Keiretsu system, but surprisingly different from the 
characteristics for Indian business group depicted in Khanna and Palepu (2000).  
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Secondly, however, unlike Japanese keiretsu, Korean business groups are highly 
centralized. Although each group exists as an independent legal entity, there is a central office 
for members of its main staff, which overviews and facilitates management of all group firms. 
This office can exist as a separate legal entity or as a unit the core-group firm and typically plays 
a role of a holding company of the business group. Thus, an individual firm in a chaebol is more 
like a division of a large multi-segment conglomerate in the U.S. Finally, through the nexus of 
complicated cross-shareholdings and pyramid ownership structure, the owner-managers typically 
have ultimately control over all firms within the business group. They may seek to exercise 
discretionary power to maximize their welfare during the firm decision-making process by 
expropriating minority shareholders.  This gives us a particularly interesting hypothesis for 
mitigating agency problems with managerial ownership suggested by Scharfstein and Stein 
(2000). Owner-managers have a virtual ownership stake in most member firms within a chaebol, 
so we argue that “tunneling” hypothesis will be most applicable, a view consistent with the 
finding by Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002). 
The list of our chaebol sample is fixed as of the fiscal year ending in 1996. One problem with this 
definition of chaebol  is that the sample introduces the survivorship bias in capital allocation 
practices. That is, the apparent after-crisis improvements in efficiency may be driven by the 
business groups that kept chaebol status in 1996, but dropped out of the list after that. As a check 
on the robustness of our results, we replicate our regressions more conservatively using a new list 
of chaebols. More specifically, we define top 30 groups based on the asset size every year over the 
sample period, which allows different combination of business groups eligible for chaebol status 
year by year. Since more than half of the top 30 chaebol group firms in 1996 are dropped out after 
the financial crisis, our original sample period ends at year 2000. But with this new definition of 
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chaebol, our sample period extends to year 2003. The results are reported in Table 8 and are 
consistent with the main findings in Table 3. As expected, we find less pre-crisis cross-
subsidization practices with the new list of chaebols, but we can still find the evidence of cross-
subsidization when we use the sum of other group firms’ cash flows instead of median. Overall, 
our results do not appear to be driven by the survivorship bias. 
  
V. Conclusion 
Internal capital markets play a major role in allocating capital in diversified firms. The 
question of whether internal capital markets lead to inefficient capital allocation is still on debate 
and provides the needs for further empirical investigation across different countries, industries, 
and periods. In this paper, we provide strong evidence consistent with the existence of the dark 
side of internal capital markets using a sample of Korean chaebol firms during the period from 
1991 to 2000. We also provide the evidence of how the efficiency of capital allocation has 
improved by comparing the results before the financial crisis and after the crisis. 
Our main finding is that diversified chaebol firms make inefficient investment through 
the early 1990s before the financial crisis. We first document that chaebol firms’ investment 
cannot be justified by good investment opportunities during the whole sample period. By 
contrast, investment of non-chaebol firms is more responsive to investment opportunities. We 
also find that the relationship between a chaebol firm’s investment and its own cash flows is 
negative before the crisis. This finding suggests that poorly performing chaebol firms were even 
making greater investments during the pre-crisis period, and is consistent with the findings in 
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1991), where the liquidity of Japanese independent firms has a 
strong positive relationship with the investment expenditures, while the investment expenditures 
of Japanese keiretsu firms are less sensitive to cash flows. The findings in our paper is also in 
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line with the arguments reported in Villalonga (2004) where conglomerate diversification 
continues to generate discounts, while related diversification is associated with premiums 
especially during the pre-crisis period. 
We also find the evidence of cross-subsidization among chaebol firms during the pre-
crisis period. That is, a chaebol firm’s investment decision is positively affected by the cash flow 
of other firms in the same chaebol  group. Further, the cross-subsidization has been mainly 
arranged by poorly performing firms, suggesting an inefficient wealth transfer.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis addressed in Johnson et al. (2000) 
that there is a wealth transfer from well-performing group firms to poorly performing firms. This 
suggests that the existence of the dark side of internal capital markets in Korea before the Asian 
financial crisis. However, we find little evidence of inefficient capital allocation among chaebol 
firms after the crisis. During our post-crisis sample period from 1999 to 2000, we find a 
significantly positive relationship between a chaebol firm’s investment and its own operating 
cash flows, and the phenomenon of cross-subsidization has substantially reduced. This after-
crisis finding is consistent with the view that the discipline by the market is largely restraining 
the use of inefficient internal capital markets by the chaebol firms.  
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Appendix 
Pre-crisis Top 30 business groups (chaebols) in Korea 
 
This table shows a list of top 30 chaebols before the crisis as of the fiscal year ending in 1996. The table 
shows the main bank, the number of affiliated firms and the amounts of the internal trading that sell and 
buy goods and services to and from other affiliated firms during the fiscal year 1996. Hanil Bank and 





















1 Hyundai  Korea  Exchange  57  17.8  6 
2 Samsung  Hanil  80  31.5  8 
3 LuckyGoldstar(LG)  Korea  First  49  18.8  7 
4  Daewoo  Korea First   32  35.4  5 
5  S.K  Korea First   46  19.2  2 
6 Ssangyong  Cho  Hung  25  35.5  5 
7 Kia  Korea  First  28  19.9  3 
8 Hanjin  Hanil  24  5.7  2 
9 Korea  Explosive  Hanil  31  32.6  6 
10 Lotte  Commercial  30  7.1  1 
11 Kumho  Cho  Hung  26  11.8  2 
12 Halla  Korea  Exchange  18  29.8  0 
13 Doosan  Commercial  25  14.6  2 
14 Dong-ah  Commercial  19  0.6  1 
15 Daelim  Hanil  21  2.0  3 
16 Hansol  Hanil  23 17.8 1 
17 Kolon  Hanil  24  5.3  0 
18 Jinro  Commercial  24  15.4  2 
19 Dongkuk  Seoul  17 6.3 1 
20 Kohap  Hanil  13 43.3 0 
21 Dongbu  Seoul  34  9.0  8 
22 Haitai  Cho  Hung  15  5.5  4 
23 Newcore  Korea First  18 0.0 5 
24 Anam  Cho Hung  21 72.6 1 
25 Tongyang  Hanil  24 9.8 0 
26 Hannil  Hanil  7  1.0  0 
27 Keopyung  Cho Hung  22 15.2 0 
28 Miwon  Hanil  25 18.7 5 
29 Hyosung  Hanil  18  10.2  0 
30 Shinho  Korea First  25 9.3 1 
  Average (median)   27 (24)  17.4 (14.9)  2.7 (2) 
  Top 5 Average (Median)  53 (49)  24.5 (19.2)  5.6 (6) 
 
 
                                            
12 The figures are based on Chang and Hong (1998). 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of capital expenditure to sales ratio 
Capital expenditure is the sum of changes in fixed assets and depreciation. The sample period is from 
1991 to 2000. There are 6,878 firm-year observations: 6,035 non-chaebol firm-years and 843 chaebol 
firm-years. 
 
Panel A: Whole sample 
  No.  First   Third 
Year Observations  Mean Quartile  Median Quartile 
1991  475  0.092 0.009 0.040  0.101 
1992 476  0.077  -0.003  0.025  0.077 
1993 481  0.058  -0.004  0.018  0.070 
1994 502  0.050  -0.001  0.017  0.056 
1995  529  0.069 0.000 0.024  0.082 
1996 723  0.065  -0.001  0.021  0.075 
1997  816  0.046 0.003 0.032  0.091 
1998 826  -0.012  -0.026  0.017  0.123 
1999 937  -0.012  -0.025  0.009  0.073 
2000 1113  0.070  -0.010  0.020  0.103 
Total 6878  0.045  -0.005  0.021  0.085 
 
Panel B: Non-chaebol firms 
  No.  First   Third 
Year Observations  Mean Quartile  Median Quartile 
1991  400  0.086 0.009 0.039  0.097 
1992 401  0.074  -0.006  0.022  0.072 
1993 406  0.055  -0.006  0.017  0.064 
1994 424  0.045  -0.003  0.014  0.050 
1995 449  0.058  -0.001  0.020  0.074 
1996 635  0.053  -0.002  0.019  0.064 
1997  727  0.037 0.001 0.028  0.087 
1998 736  -0.020  -0.025  0.015  0.119 
1999 843  -0.012  -0.023  0.009  0.072 
2000 1014  0.080  -0.008  0.022  0.112 
Total 6035  0.041  -0.006  0.020  0.082 
 
Panel C: Chaebol firms 
  No.  First   Third 
Year Observations  Mean Quartile  Median Quartile 
1991  75  0.123 0.011 0.047  0.123 
1992  75  0.089 0.006 0.045  0.117 
1993  75  0.073 0.001 0.024  0.107 
1994  78  0.080 0.008 0.035  0.074 
1995  80  0.130 0.007 0.050  0.146 
1996  88  0.155 0.018 0.058  0.165 
1997  89  0.117 0.015 0.055  0.127 
1998 90  0.057  -0.036  0.036  0.161 
1999  94  -0.006 -0.035 -0.001  0.075 
2000 99  -0.035  -0.031  0.001  0.032 
Total  843  0.077 0.000 0.035  0.109 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: Chaebol firms vs. Non-Chaebol firms 
Total assets are first normalized into year 2000 Korean Won using the year-end Korean Consumer Price 
Index, then translated into US dollars using Korean Won/ US Dollar exchange at the end of year 2000. 
Market to Book is defined as (book value of assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/assets. 
Cash Flow is defined as (operating income plus depreciation) divided by net assets. Net working capital is 
defined as (current assets minus current liabilities minus cash) divided by net assets. Total leverage is 
defined as long-term plus short-term debt/total assets. Capital expenditures are defined as (changes in 
fixed asset plus depreciation) divided by net assets. Industry is defined as the same 2 digit of Standard 
Industry Code for Korea. R&D is R&D divided by net assets. When R&D is listed as missing, it is set to 
zero. Cash is the sum of cash on hand (#1100) and marketable securities (#1140). Net-assets are assets 
minus cash. Compensating balance is the sum of other deposits (#1134) and short-term financial 
instruments (#1220). If compensating balance is missing than compensating balance is equal to the cash 
(#1100). If compensating balance/average bank loan is greater than 10, we treat them as missing. Interest 
is interest expenses (#6110). 
 All  Non-chaebol  Chaebol  Difference 
 Mean  Median  Mean Median Mean Median Mean  t-stat Median p-value
Total assets  
(in million USD) 
447.6 91.6 306.9 75.9 1455.3 706.5 -1148.4 -14.07  -630.6 0.00 
Market to book ratio  1.122 0.960 1.138 0.958 1.006 0.964 0.132 5.15 -0.006 0.48 
Cash flow  0.062 0.065 0.062 0.066 0.057 0.059 0.006 2.17 0.007 0.00 
Net working capital  -0.004 0.003  0.007 0.014 -0.082 -0.078 0.089 10.71 0.092 0.00 
Leverage  0.676 0.650 0.663 0.631 0.768 0.757 -0.105 -9.99 -0.127 0.00 
Bank loan / Debt  0.411 0.412 0.414 0.414 0.389 0.396 0.025 4.06 0.019 0.00 
Capital expenditures  0.045 0.022 0.044 0.020 0.051 0.033 -0.007 -1.48 -0.013 0.00 
R&D / Net assets  0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 5.17 0.000 0.00 
Cash / Net assets  0.120 0.073 0.128 0.078 0.067 0.044 0.060 17.82 0.035 0.00 
Compensating balances / 
Average bank loan 
0.528 0.224 0.570 0.248 0.233 0.106 0.337 14.37 0.143 0.00 
Interest / Avg. bank loan  0.378 0.146 0.273 0.145 1.123 0.157 -0.851 -1.01 -0.012 0.00 
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Table 3. Estimation of capital expenditure deviation (CAPXDEV) to industry Q and cash flow: All chaebol firms 
This table presents results from the OLS regressions that estimate the impact of investment opportunities and cash flows (own or of other group 
firms) on the chaebol firms’ investment. The sample period is from 1992 to 2000. The pre-crisis subperiod is between 1992 and 1996, and the 
post-crisis subperiod is between 1999 and 2000. t-stats are in parentheses. Dependent Variable (CAPXDEV) is defined as capital 
expenditures/sales for diversified chaebol firms minus capital expenditures/sales for industry median for single segment firms. IndustryQ is the 
median beginning-of-period Q of all non-chaebol firms in the same 2-digit SIC code. Q is defined as (firm’s book value of total assets + 
market value of outstanding shares – book value of equity) / firm’s book value of total assets, and CFSDEV is the ratio of chaebol firm’s 
cash-flow to sales less the industry median ratio of cash flow to sales for single-segment firms. Cash-flow is defined as segment operating income 
plus depreciation. Other_CFSDEV is the median CFSDEV value of all other affiliated group firms. Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels. 
 
Panel A: Full sample (1992-2000) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
IndustryQ  0.022 0.025 0.025 
    (0.52)  (0.51) 
    0.232 
(1.70)  (1.38) 
   0.173 
     (0.94) 






Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. Obs  724  724  689 
Adj-R
2 0.0144 
     
Panel B: Pre-crisis sub-period (1992-1996) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
IndustryQ  0.128   0.106  0.064
 (0.65)  (0.33)  (0.52) 
    -1.122*** 
   (-4.32)  (-3.88) 
   1.032*** 
     (2.75) 
0.0383  0.0590 
CFSDEV  -1.198***
Other_CFSDEV 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. Obs  376  376  350 
Adj-R
2 -0.0075 
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